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Note 
Tempting the Sword of Damocles: Reimagining 
the Copyright/DMCA Framework in a UGC World 
Jordan Sundell* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the last twenty years the landscape of information dis-
tribution and commentary has undergone a kaleidoscope of 
changes. Take, for example, Rip Van Winkle.  If, rather than 
sleeping through the American Revolution, he had instead fal-
len into his slumber on the precipice of the 1990s only to wake 
in the present, he would scarcely recognize the current infor-
mation terrain. Prime among those revolutions is the Internet. 
Ushering in an era of information, the Internet provides 
ready access to almost any topic or proclivity a person could de-
sire or imagine. If not, wait a few weeks and someone will upl-
oad an article, book, or video that rectifies the oversight.1 
Moreover, the Internet, combined with technological tools, 
enables people to interact with and alter the information they 
encounter in ways previously unimagined. For example, a per-
son can pen a political piece featuring an embedded video from 
a television news program on his or her blog,2 or take Queen’s 
“Another One Bites the Dust,” merge it with Daft Punk’s “Da 
Funk,” and voilà, “Another One Bites Da Funk.”3 Or someone 
                                                          
© 2011 Jordan Sundell. 
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 1. See, e.g., Brian Stelter, Some Media Companies Choose to Profit from 
Pirated YouTube Clips, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2008, at C1 (noting that every 
minute, thirteen hours of video is uploaded to YouTube alone). 
 2. See, e.g., David Kurtz, GOP Eating Its Own, TALKING POINTS MEMO 
(Jan. 10, 2008, 7:04 PM), http://talkingpointsmemo.com/archives/063381.php. 
 3. List of Mashup Songs, WIKIPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_mashup_songs (last visited Jan. 23, 2010, 
11:58 PM). 
Sundell J. Tempting the Sword of Damocles: Reimagining the Copy-
right/DMCA Framework in a UGC World. Minnesota Journal of Law, 
Science & Technology. 2011;12(1):335-363. 
121_SUNDELL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/4/2011  7:50 AM 
336 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 12:1 
 
 
can take clips from Beyoncé Knowles’s song “Single Ladies,” 
splice them together with the theme to the Andy Griffith Show, 
and create a parody featured on SI.com’s Hot Clicks.4 
Herein resides the problem. User-generated content (UGC) 
and the technology enabling its existence gives users many new 
and often meaningful ways to communicate, but all too fre-
quently that communication unlawfully uses copyrighted ma-
terial.5 At what point should the line be drawn between copy-
right holders’ financial interests, and everyone else’s creative 
interests? And given the ease, anonymity, and pervasiveness of 
UGC, what should copyright enforcement look like in the UGC 
arena? 
Thus far, the existing legal framework has failed to provide 
adequate solutions for the rise of UGC. For example, current 
U.S. copyright law allows large media companies to wield an 
imposing sword over the heads of those who, usually for no rea-
son other than impressing their friends and acquaintances, 
create Internet content that may include unauthorized portions 
of copyrighted works.6 Such UGC is created at such a break-
neck pace that copyright holders use every weapon in their ar-
senal to keep all said content off the Internet—whether or not 
the content really is a violation of the holder’s rights. 
This Note proposes a series of simple alterations to the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) and copyright law 
that would foster the “Progress of the Arts,” while respecting 
the spirit of copyright holders’ rights according to the Copyright 
Act. Part I of this Note describes what UGC is, why it matters, 
                                                          
 4. See Single Ladies (In Mayberry), YOUTUBE (Dec. 16, 2008), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GE-l4gfiCM8. 
 5. While there is a consensus that UGC uses copyrighted material, there 
is far less agreement on the extent of UGC’s actual usage of copyrighted ma-
terial. For example, one study suggested that less than six percent of all views 
on YouTube comprised copyrighted material. BRI HOLT, HEIDI R. LYNN & 
MICHAEL SOWERS, ANALYSIS OF COPYRIGHTED VIDEOS ON YOUTUBE.COM 2 
(2007). A different study concluded that twelve percent of YouTube videos in-
fringed copyrights. Michael Wesch, YouTube Statistics, DIGITAL 
ETHNOGRAPHY @ KSU, (Aug. 13 2008, 2:02 PM), 
http://ksudigg.wetpaint.com/page/YouTube+Statistics. 
 6. Debora Halbert, Mass Culture and the Culture of the Masses: A Mani-
festo for User-Generated Rights, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 921, 931–32 
(2009) (noting that key players such as Google, actual users, and public inter-
est groups were absent from the talks over the DMCA and that as a result the 
principles in the DMCA “were not intended to strike a balance between fair 
use and ownership, but rather to solidify ownership.”). 
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and the interplay between copyright law, the DMCA, and UGC. 
Part II of this Note looks into the inequities of the current ap-
proach and suggests a series of simple solutions. Finally, Part 
III concludes that to remedy the DMCA’s favoritism towards 
major content providers, legislatures or the courts should modi-
fy the current UGC legal framework with clear rules that: (1) 
expressly limit (or eliminate) liability for non-economic UGC,7 
(2) impose increased policing and financial responsibilities on 
sites specializing in copyright-infringing UGC content, and (3) 
reduce frivolous and non-particularized claims of infringement. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. WHAT IS UGC? 
In general, UGC is creative content8 produced and pub-
lished, usually by individuals who possess limited technical ex-
pertise,9 out of a desire to share, connect with others, or simply 
to express oneself.10 Examples of UGC include weblogs11 (i.e., 
“blogs”), wikis,12 social networks,13 RSS feeds,14 the user com-
                                                          
 7. Non-economic UGC in this Note means UGC produced without any 
intent to profit, and which does not cause more than de minimis financial 
damage to infringed copyright holders. 
 8. Content encompasses a broad range of creative works including writ-
ten, audio, visual, or a mixture thereof. Org. Econ. Co-operation & Dev., Parti-
cipative Web: User Created Content 8 (Working Party on the Information 
Economy, Report No. DSTI/ICCP/IE(2006)7/FINAL), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/57/14/38393115.pdf [hereinafter OCED]. 
 9. Id. But see id. at 9 (suggesting that the media and other sophisticated 
Internet users increasingly buy or create UGC and UGC platforms for finan-
cial reasons). 
 10. Id. 
 11. Blog, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/869092/blog (last modified Sept. 
28, 2010, 12:39 PM) (defining a blog as an “online journal where an individual, 
group, or corporation presents a record of activities, thoughts, or beliefs”). 
 12. Wiki, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1192819/wiki (last modified Sept. 
28, 2010, 12:44 PM) (defining a wiki as a “site that can be modified or contri-
buted to by users” such as Wikipedia). 
 13. Social network, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1335211/social-network (last mod-
ified Sept. 28, 2010, 12:47 PM) (defining a social network as “an online com-
munity of individuals who exchange messages, share information, and, in 
some cases, cooperate on joint activities”). Prominent examples include Face-
book, MySpace, Twitter, and LinkedIn. 
 14. RSS, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1508925/RSS (last modified Sept. 
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ments section at the end of news pieces, evaluations from prod-
uct reviews, and, most notably, distribution sites like YouTube 
and Metacafe. 
In addition to the above generalizations about the nature 
of UGC, UGC also possesses a handful of commonly agreed 
upon characteristics. First, it must be accessible via the Inter-
net15 on either public websites or more restricted sites, like fee 
sites or private message boards. So, for example, email and in-
stant messaging would not fit this rubric since they are not 
public media.16 Nor would a poem or song someone writes, but 
never shows to anyone, be UGC since it is neither public nor in 
the stream of commerce. Second, the content must be in some 
way creative.17 In part, this requires that users “add their own 
value to the work,”18 such as adding background music, dub-
bing, captions, remixes, or synthesizing two or more works. In 
contrast, wholesale copying of part of a movie or television 
show is not UGC.19 This distinction is important since it ex-
cludes what copyright holders fear most from underneath 
UGC’s umbrella: outright copying with no value added.20 Final-
ly, the content must be “created outside of professional routines 
and practices.”21 This prong focuses on the creator’s motivation, 
or, just as importantly, what did not motivate the creator. The 
work must not be made with the expectation of remuneration 
or profit.22 Rather, the creator must act out of a desire to con-
nect with others, for the sake of expression, or to gain fame or 
notoriety.23 In other words, creative content created and pub-
lished by a person as part of his or her job is not UGC, but con-
                                                          
28, 2010, 12:50 PM) (defining Really Simple Syndication (RSS) as a “format 
used to provide subscribers with new content from frequently updated Web 
sites”). 
 15. OECD, supra note 8, at 4. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 8. 
 19. Casey Fiesler, Everything I Need to Know I Learned from Fandom: 
How Existing Social Norms Can Help Shape the Next Generation of User-
Generated Content, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 729, 741−42 (2008). 
 20. Id. at 741. Of course, copyright holders are not fully satisfied by this 
reasoning in cases where the alleged infringer’s use of the copyright reduces 
the value of the copyright holder’s copyright in some way. 
 21. OECD, supra note 8. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
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tent developed and made publicly available by a person who is 
not getting paid (even if they hope their work product will lead 
to financial rewards down the road), assuming it also satisfies 
the other UGC requirements.24 
B. GENIE OUT OF THE BOTTLE: WHY UGC MATTERS 
Largely non-existent at the turn of the millennium, UGC 
has become a fixture of Internet use.25 Indeed, over half of 
American Internet users access UGC at least once a month26 
while over forty percent of American Internet users regularly 
use UGC.27 With that explosion in popularity, UGC has trans-
formed into big business.28 For instance, in 2009, YouTube gen-
erated approximately a quarter billion dollars alone,29 while 
UGC in the aggregate reportedly created over $1 billion in ad 
revenue, and that figure is projected to rise to $4.3 billion by 
2011.30 That is more money than the gross domestic product of 
at least forty-three countries.31 
Given the soaring trajectory of online usage,32 the panoply 
of technologies that make UGC possible, and the wealth of 
available content to synthesize and inspire, UGC’s growth will 
                                                          
 24. See id. at 8–9. 
 25. See User Content Creation around the World, EMARKETER (Dec. 28, 
2009), http://www.emarketer.com/Article.aspx?R=1007440 (noting that over 
ninety-two million Americans and similar percentages of Internet users in 
China and Japan regularly manage social networking profiles, upload video, or 
blog). 
 26. John Horrigan, Home Broadband Adoption 2006: Summary of Find-
ings, PEW INTERNET (May 28, 2006), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2006/Home-Broadband-Adoption-
2006/1-Summary-of-Findings.aspx. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Eric Krangel, YouTube Will Take Half a Billion Off Google’s Bottom 
Line This Year, BUSINESS INSIDER (Apr. 3, 2009, 10:40 PM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/analyst-youtube-will-take-half-a-billion-off-
googles-bottom-line-this-year-2009-4 (stating that YouTube earned $240 mil-
lion dollars in ad revenue in 2009); INTERACTIVE ADVERTISING BUREAU, USER 
GENERATED CONTENT, SOCIAL MEDIA, AND ADVERTISING—AN OVERVIEW 1 
(Apr. 2008), available at http://www.iab.net/media/file/2008_ugc_platform.pdf. 
 29. Krangel, supra note 28. 
 30. Paul Verna, User Generated Content: Will Web 2.0 Pay Its Way?, 
EMARKETER (June 2007), 
http://www.emarketer.com/Report.aspx?code=emarketer_2000421. 
 31. Gross Domestic Product 2009, WORLD BANK (2009), 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GDP.pdf. 
 32. Internet users (per 100 people), WORLD BANK (2009) (showing a 75% 
increase in Internet usage in the United States between 1990 and 2008), 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.USER.P2. 
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almost certainly put considerable pressure on the existing cop-
yright framework until changes to the status quo occur.33 For 
example, simple blogging software accessible for free on sites 
like LiveJournal34 and Blogger35 enable anyone with access to 
the Internet to draw viewers to the website by copying and 
pasting copyrighted material and then commenting on that ma-
terial. Similarly, iPod and iTunes, in conjunction with afforda-
ble recording hardware, make podcasting that may or may not 
include copyrighted material attainable for virtually anyone in-
terested in trying their hand at it.36 Likewise, editing programs 
(e.g., iMovie and Windows Movie Maker) in concert with low 
cost digital camcorders and sites for uploading videos (e.g., 
YouTube) have fundamentally altered the distributional scope 
of home movies.37 
The genie is out of the bottle. UGC producers have an ex-
tensive chest of tools to re-package and publish copyrighted 
material that copyright holders are ill-equipped to protect 
against and which generates significant revenue for UGC web-
sites like YouTube. Moreover, as will be discussed below, what 
weapons copyright holders have are disproportionately leveled 
at UGC producers, which seldom derive financial benefit from 
their creative endeavors, rather than at UGC-centric websites, 
which profit from the copyright infringement. The status quo is 
problematic. It comes down too hard on UGC producers, inade-
quately protects copyright holders, and seemingly lets UGC-
centric websites off the hook. A new legal framework is needed. 
C. HISTORICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF COPYRIGHT 
In wrestling with the conflicting goals of promoting 
                                                          
 33. But see Tony Dokoupil, Is User-Generated Content Out? Revenge of the 
Experts, NEWSWEEK.COM (Mar. 6, 2008) http://www.newsweek.com/id/119091 
(suggesting that the rise of UGC will be moderated as people reset their prefe-
rence back to reliable information provided by experts); Krangel, supra note 28 
(highlighting that YouTube is hemorrhaging money and that this trend is like-
ly to continue). 
 34. LIVEJOURNAL, http://www.livejournal.com (last visited Aug. 28, 2010). 
 35. BLOGGER, http://www.blogger.com (last visited Aug. 28, 2010). 
 36. See generally What Is Podcasting?, PODCASTING NEWS, 
http://www.podcastingnews.com/articles/What_is_Podcasting.html (last visited 
Jan. 23, 2011) (providing a general overview of podcasting). 
 37. See Rick Broida, Alpha Geek: Video Editing 101, LIFEHACKER (Dec. 11, 
2006, 12:30 PM), http://lifehacker.com/software/digital-video/alpha-geek-video-
editing-101-220595.php. 
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progress and innovation and guarding intellectual property, the 
Framers of the Constitution hoped to advance three principle 
aims: “the promotion of learning, the protection of the public 
domain, and the granting of an exclusive right to the author.”38 
Ultimately, the Framers balanced the tension by empowering 
Congress with the authority to create time-limited copyrights 
that permitted copyright holders the exclusive right to control 
and benefit from their original works with the express goal “[t]o 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”39 In other 
words, the Framers sought to promote the expression of new 
ideas by allowing copyright holders a period to exclusively ben-
efit from his or her copyrights, but, at the same time, foreclosed 
a monopoly over those copyrights into perpetuity by imposing 
time limits. In this way, the Framers made creativity a poten-
tially profitable pursuit while guaranteeing society as a whole 
would benefit from that creativity. 
D. WHERE THE RUBBER MEETS THE ROAD: COPYRIGHT 
INFRINGEMENT IN A UGC WORLD 
1. Infringement 
Copyright holders have a series of rights empowering them 
to control the dissemination of their work. For example, under 
17 U.S.C. § 106 copyright owners have the exclusive right to 
reproduce their work,40 prepare derivative works,41 distribute 
copies,42 publicly perform,43 publicly display,44 or publicly per-
form the work by means of a digital audio transmission (in the 
case of sound recordings).45 In addition to protecting these 
rights against direct infringement,46 once a direct infringer is 
found, copyright law permits the holder to go for the deeper 
                                                          
 38. SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1261 (11th 
Cir. 2001). 
 39. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 40. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2006). 
 41. Id. § 106(2). 
 42. Id. § 106(3). 
 43. Id. § 106(4). 
 44. Id. § 106(5). 
 45. Id. § 106(6). 
 46. In order to prove copyright infringement, a plaintiff must show owner-
ship of a valid copyright and unauthorized copying by the defendant. Reyher v. 
Children’s Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 90 (2d Cir. 1976) (citing 
McGraw-Hill, Inc. v. Worth Publishers, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 415, 419 (S.D.N.Y. 
1971)). 
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pockets of parties who may have contributed47 or induced48 the 
infringement directly or vicariously.49 For instance, this plays 
out when someone uploads a video onto YouTube containing an 
artist’s music in the background such as a slideshow of photos 
from a recent vacation to music. While copyright holder X may 
not be interested in suing John Doe for his home-made musical 
collage, YouTube’s contribution and inducement to John’s in-
fringing use (as well as YouTube’s much deeper pockets) make 
for a tempting target of litigation. 
2. Fair Use 
At the same time, use of a copyrighted work does not al-
ways constitute infringement. The fair use doctrine sometimes 
permits the use of copyrighted material regardless of the copy-
                                                          
 47. For contributory infringement, first, the accused must have contri-
buted to a direct infringement. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. 
Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930 (2005). Second, the contributory infringer 
(i.e., the accused) must have actually or constructively known about the direct 
infringement. See id. at 936–37. Given the difficulty in showing actual or con-
structive knowledge to demonstrate the infringer’s intent to infringe, courts 
generally delve deeply into the facts to divine whether intent existed. See id. 
at 935 (noting that “where evidence goes beyond a product’s characteristics or 
the knowledge that it may be put to infringing uses, and shows statements or 
actions directed to promoting infringement” liability may be found); see also id. 
at 936 (enumerating a list of cases where various courts made a fact-intensive 
inquiry into whether or not intent existed). For example, willful blindness (the 
ostrich defense), Marcelo Halpern, User Generated Content—Key Issues, 901 
PLI/PAT 203, 212 (2007), or a business model that relies on copyright in-
fringement, see Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 545 U.S. at 939–40, may suffice to 
show constructive knowledge of direct infringement. Third, the contributory 
infringer must materially contribute to the infringement. See Sony Corp. v. 
Universal City Studies, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 446–47 (1984). 
 48. Inducement requires an actual direct infringement. Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer 545 U.S.  at 930. Additionally, the inducing infringer must act with the 
purpose of promoting infringement of copyrights and with awareness that the 
end users are directly infringing the copyrights. Id. at 930, 935–37. Finally, 
the inducing infringer must also materially contribute to the actual direct in-
fringement. Id. at 930–31. 
 49. Similar to contributory infringement and inducement, to show vica-
rious infringement the plaintiff must show an actual direct infringement. Hal-
pern, supra note 47, at 213. The vicarious infringer must also have a financial 
interest in the infringement. Id. To demonstrate this, courts regularly rely on 
evidence about the alleged infringer’s business model. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 
545 U.S. at 940–41. For instance, many websites make money based on the 
number of people who look at their website. The more traffic the site receives, 
the greater its ad revenue. Id. at 940. For blogs and video sites that rely on ad 
revenue generated from UGC-enticed traffic, claims of vicarious infringement 
loom as a potential consequence. 
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right owner’s wishes.50 Fair use is an affirmative defense for al-
leged infringers involving four factors: (1) the nature of the al-
legedly infringing use, (2) the nature of the copyrighted work, 
(3) the amount of the work copied, and (4) the market effect of 
the use.51 
While a promising solution to the UGC dilemma at first 
blush, fair use offers minimal cover for UGC producers since 
fair use can only be raised after a content user’s material has 
been removed and the copyright holder alleges copyright in-
fringement.52 Because fair use is only triggered after a copy-
right holder alleges infringement, UGC producers meeting the 
fair use criterion do not presumptively have the right to pro-
duce the work.53 Instead, UGC producers must risk removal 
and the cost of a lawsuit before even getting to raise fair use as 
an affirmative defense.54 By then, the damage is often done. 
3. Damages 
U.S. copyright law provides for statutory damages of be-
tween $750 and $30,000 per work infringed55 as well as lost 
profits and unjust enrichment.56 Given the ubiquity of down-
loading and listening to songs online, statutory damages rise 
fast—too fast. For example, in Viacom International v. You-
Tube, Inc., Viacom’s complaint against YouTube alleged that 
more than 150,000 works violating Viacom’s copyrights existed 
on YouTube, amounting to a minimum of $112.5 million in 
damages.57 Viacom’s complaint asked for at least $1 billion in 
                                                          
 50. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
 51. Id. 
 52. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994). 
 53. Ian Chung, Be Wary of Adding Your Own Soundtrack: Lenz v. Univer-
sal and How the Fair Use Policy Should Be Applied to User Generated Content, 
29 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 163, 175 (2009). 
 54. Id. 
 55. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2006). 
 56. 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (2006). Lost profits can be difficult to determine for 
works not ordinarily distributed such as independent video projects later used 
in other projects. For example, the movie Funny People starring Adam Sand-
ler used a number of real-life videos in the course of the movie. FUNNY PEOPLE 
(Universal Pictures 2009). Likewise, unjust enrichment often is difficult to 
prove, but generally involves an analysis of advertising revenue earned in 
connection with views of the infringed material. For example, if Metacafe or 
Veoh makes $20,000 in ad revenue from displaying an infringing video, the 
money would constitute unjust enrichment. 
 57. Complaint at 3, Viacom Int’l v. YouTube, Inc., (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (No. 07-
cv-2103), 2007 WL 775611 (estimating the total based on 150,000 infringe-
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damages.58 
E. PROTECTIONS FOR INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDERS: DIGITAL 
MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT 
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), enacted in 
1998, sought to balance the interests of content owners, Online 
Service Providers (OSPs), and information users as well as en-
couraging the continued growth of the Internet and electronic 
commerce.59 In particular, Congress intended the DMCA to enl-
ist the aid of OSPs in reducing the growing level of copyright 
infringement on the Internet.60 To that effect, the DMCA im-
munizes an OSP from liability where the OSP honors a copy-
right holder’s takedown request in good faith.61 This “safe har-
bor” protects OSPs from liability for transitory digital network 
communications,62 system caching,63 information residing on 
systems or networks at the direction of users,64 and information 
location tools65 (i.e., where the OSP is passive—merely provid-
ing access to its network for transmission or storage purposes). 
To be eligible for the DMCA safe harbor, an OSP must first 
adopt, reasonably implement, and inform users of a policy that 
gives the OSP the power to terminate users who are repeat in-
fringers. For instance, Facebook’s terms of use state: “[i]f you 
repeatedly infringe other people’s intellectual property rights, 
we will disable your account when appropriate.”66 The policy 
must also accommodate standard technical measures utilized 
by copyright owners in order to identify or protect copyrighted 
works.67 Second, the OSP must demonstrate it did not have ac-
                                                          
ments and statutory damages of $750 per infringement). 
 58. Id. at 5. 
 59. H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 21 (1998). 
 60. See Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass’n of Am. Inc., 391 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th 
Cir. 2004). 
 61. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3) (2006). 
 62. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a) (2006). Transitory digital network communica-
tions are transmissions initiated by someone other than the service provider. 
 63. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(b) (2006). System caching is the storing of mate-
rials from other networks on the service provider’s network. 
 64. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2006). 
 65. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(d) (2006). This section protects OSPs for electroni-
cally citing or linking to an infringing site. 
 66. Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK (Oct. 4, 2010), 
http://www.facebook.com/terms.php. 
 67. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A). 
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tual knowledge that its system contained infringing materials 
or an awareness of facts or circumstances—“red flags”—from 
which infringement appears likely.68 If at any time the OSP 
learns of potentially infringing material, it must immediately 
remove the content.69 Third, the OSP must show that it did not 
receive a financial benefit directly linked to an infringing activ-
ity it had both the right and ability to control.70 Fourth, upon a 
good faith notification by the copyright holder of infringement, 
the OSP must promptly block access or take down the infring-
ing material.71 At the same time, the subscriber that put up the 
content can challenge the site’s removal (albeit usually after 
the fact).72 Assuming the subscriber follows the appropriate 
counter notification procedure the service provider must re-
place or restore the removed material within ten to fourteen 
days of receipt of the notice.73 
In a perfect world where everyone follows the spirit of the 
rules, the DMCA, with its requirements that websites police 
                                                          
 68. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c). To date, the case law suggests that these red 
flags must be rather conspicuous. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 481 F.3d 
751, 763 (9th Cir. 2007), amended by Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 
1102 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding appellations depicting pornography as “illegal” 
and “stolen” insufficient to show infringement since the labels may have simp-
ly been “an attempt to increase the salacious appeal” of the photographs); Io 
Group., Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1148–49 (N.D. Cal. 
2008) (holding that the presence of the plaintiff’s trademark on a pornographic 
video uploaded by a user did not constitute a red flag because the plaintiff 
failed to provide enough evidence indicating the site knew about the trade-
marks). 
 69. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii). Interestingly, this provision may actually 
encourage OSPs to actively avoid investigating their networks so that they do 
not discover infringing content to remove. As a result, at least one author has 
suggested that with the genesis of Web 2.0 and its reliance on UGC, OSPs 
have broken their bargain with copyright holders. See Brandon Brown, Note, 
Fortifying the Safe Harbors: Reevaluating the DMCA in a Web 2.0 World, 23 
BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 437, 437 (2008). That is, the DMCA was supposed to 
provide OSPs with limited immunity in exchange for greater policing and co-
operation in protecting copyrighted works. However, since those same sites 
have come to increasingly rely on users to upload and control the content on 
the OSPs websites, OSPs effectively skirt their end of the bargain. Id. 
 70. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B). 
 71. Id. § 512(c)(1)(C). In practice, given the volume of complaints, the time 
and manpower requirements to check each takedown request are prohibitive. 
See Ian C. Ballon, DMCA Liability Limitations for Social Networks, Blogs, 
Websites and Other Service Providers, 978 PLI/PAT 641, 653 (2009). Given the 
cost and the fact that OSPs are immunized from liability for improper take-
downs, OSPs have significant incentive to acquiesce to all takedown demands. 
 72. 17 U.S.C. § 512(g). 
 73. Id. § 512(g)(2)(C). 
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themselves for copyright violations and that copyright holders 
have a good faith before submitting a takedown request as well 
as its empowerment of UGC up-loaders to challenge takedown 
notices, seems more or less reasonable. However, as the discus-
sion below will demonstrate, appearances can be deceiving. 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. THE DMCA AS A SWORD: TAKEDOWNS, TAKEDOWNS, AND 
MORE TAKEDOWNS 
The DMCA has created an environment that rewards indi-
scriminate, hair-trigger takedown requests74 and attempts to 
game the system.75 For example, in early 2007, Viacom de-
manded that YouTube remove more than 100,000 unauthorized 
clips of video content;76 a number of which were actually up-
loaded by Viacom itself.77 Similarly, the Science Fiction Writers 
of America (SFWA) sent takedown notices en masse to 
Scribd.com, a public document database.78 However, the SFWA 
did not own the copyright for a number of the items requested 
taken down.79 The Recording Industry Association of America 
(RIAA) has also been a repeat abuser of DMCA takedown no-
tices. For example, the RIAA has issued takedown notices 
against sites it recruited to promote its music.80 The group also 
went after an unfortunate University of Pennsylvania faculty 
                                                          
 74. See Jeffrey Cobia, Note, The Digital Millennium Copyright Act Take-
down Notice Procedure: Misuses, Abuses, and Shortcomings of the Process, 10 
MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 387, 403 (2009). 
 75. See Tom Krazit, Google’s Statement on YouTube-Viacom Court Case, 
CNET NEWS (Mar. 18, 2010, 10:38 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-30684_3-
20000711-265.html (noting that Viacom actively uploaded its own content onto 
YouTube through various covert means such as having employees rough up 
the video, then upload the material onto YouTube through fake e-mails on 
public computers). 
 76. Greg Sandoval, Viacom Demands Google, YouTube to Pull 100,000 
Clips, CNET NEWS (Feb. 2, 2007, 9:20 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-10784_3-
6155737-7.html. 
 77. Krazit, supra note 75. 
 78. Cory Doctorow, Science Fiction Writers of America Abuses the DMCA, 
BOING BOING (Aug. 30, 2007, 11:36 PM), 
http://www.boingboing.net/2007/08/30/science-fiction-writ-1.html. 
 79. Id. 
 80. See RIAA DMCA’s Sites It Recruited to Promote Music, 
MASHTECHWORLD.COM (Feb. 20, 2010, 11:01 PM), 
http://www.mashtechworld.com/2010/02/20/riaa-dmcas-sites-it-recruited-to-
promote-music/. 
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member named Peter Usher for performing an original a capel-
la song about gamma rays because his last name resembles 
Usher, the singer.81 The RIAA even issued takedown notices to 
individuals and families that did not have a computer or Inter-
net connection for allegedly uploading copyrighted material.82 
Moreover, even where the clip is a fair use, copyright hold-
ers have felt little constraint in issuing a takedown request.83 
For instance, the National Football League (NFL) sent a take-
down notice to YouTube regarding a short clip of the NFL’s 
copyright and broadcast policy posted by a law professor, Wen-
dy Seltzer. Because Seltzer posted the clip for the purpose of 
criticism, comment, and research, the NFL’s takedown request 
was almost certainly illegitimate.84 
A number of parties have also twisted the DMCA from a 
mechanism for protecting legitimate copyright holders’ rights 
online into a tool for censorship.85 For example, Michael Crook 
issued a number of takedown notices to content providers who 
rightfully possessed a picture of him. In an effort to censor use 
of the picture, Crook sent takedown requests, even though post-
ing the picture was likely a fair use, and Crook did not own the 
                                                          
 81. See Unsafe Harbors: Abusive DMCA Subpoenas and Takedown De-
mands, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Sept. 2003), 
http://www.eff.org/files/20030926_unsafe_harbors.pdf. 
 82. See Carl Longino, RIAA, Again, Sues Family Without a Computer, 
TECHDIRT (Apr. 24, 2006, 11:43 AM), 
http://techdirt.com/articles/20060424/1141216.shtml; Ray Beckerman, Marie 
Lindor to Move for Summary Judgment, RECORDING INDUSTRY VS THE 
PEOPLE (Feb. 3, 2006, 10:00 AM), 
http://recordingindustryvspeople.blogspot.com/2006/02/marie-lindor-to-move-
for-summary.html; Mike Masnick, RIAA Sues Yet Another Person Without a 
Computer, TECHDIRT (Feb. 2, 2006 8:22 PM), 
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20060202/2021204.shtml. 
 83. See Legal Tags, The Blog, NFL Clip Down Again, 
WENDY.SELTZER.ORG (Mar. 18, 2007, 10:38 AM), 
http://wendy.seltzer.org/blog/archives/2007/03/18/nfl_clip_down_again.html; 
see also Jacqui Cheng, NFL Fumbles DMCA Takedown Battle, Could Face 
Sanctions, ARS TECHNICA (Mar. 20, 2007, 12:35 PM), 
http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20070320-nfl-fumbles-dmca-takedown-
battle-could-face-sanctions.html; Peter Lattman, Law Professor Wendy Seltzer 
Takes on the NFL, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Mar. 21, 2007, 12:27 PM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2007/03/21/law-professor-wendy-seltzer-takes-on-the-
nfl. 
 84. See Cheng, supra note 83. 
 85. See, e.g., Jason Lee Miller, YouTube Caught in Malkin, EFF, UMG 
Crossfire, WEBPRONEWS (May 11, 2007), 
http://www.webpronews.com/topnews/2007/05/11/youtube-caught-in-malkin-
eff-umg-crossfire. 
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picture or have the right to control it.86 In another case, Akon, a 
rapper, and United Music Group, which produces Akon’s 
records, sent a prominent blogger, Michelle Malkin, a takedown 
notice for a video in which Malkin spoke critically of Akon even 
though the DMCA has nothing to do with controlling critical 
speech.87 
In short, UGC producers have come under siege from a 
steady diet of takedown requests. At best, these efforts 
represent overzealousness and, on occasion, ignorance of appli-
cable law by copyright holders. At worst, they constitute bla-
tant abuses of the system by copyright holders. Either way, as 
will be discussed below, the status quo does a disservice to all 
involved. 
B. DO AS I SAY, NOT AS I DO: THE CONTENT INDUSTRY’S 
UNAUTHORIZED “BORROWING” OF ORIGINAL YOUTUBE MATERIAL 
While the commercial content industry continues its on-
slaught against any videos that may conceivably amount to a 
copyright violation, it has shown minimal concern for the intel-
lectual property rights of YouTube users posting original con-
tent. Among the 100,000 removal requests noted above was a 
YouTube video of a 2006 campaign ad for the North Carolina 
Rockingham County Board of Education.88 One of the candi-
dates, Christopher Knight, produced an ad showing himself 
wielding a light saber and the Death Star destroying a school 
while a voice-over harangued No Child Left Behind.89 Knight 
uploaded the ad onto YouTube90 where the VH1 program Web 
                                                          
 86. See Xeni Jardin, Michael Crook Sends Bogus DMCA Takedown Notice 
to BoingBoing, BOING BOING (Nov. 2, 2006, 10:52 EST), 
http://www.boingboing.net/2006/11/02/michael-crook-sends-.html; see also Jo-
nathan Bailey, How Not to Use the DMCA, PLAGIARISMTODAY (Nov. 3, 2006), 
http://www.plagiarismtoday.com/2006/11/03/how-not-to-use-the-dmca. 
 87. See Miller, supra note 85. 
 88. See Sandoval, supra note 76; Jacqui Cheng, Viacom’s “Bass-Ackwards” 
Screw-up: Issues Takedown for Video it “Pirated”, ARS TECHNICA (Aug. 30, 
2007, 8:44 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2007/08/viacom-
caught-in-copyright-infringement-loop.ars. 
 89. See Pam Belluck, Local Issues Mirror National Ones, but the Special 
Effects Occasionally Stand Alone, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2006, at A22. Lucas 
Films Ltd. did not sue over the campaign advertisement. According to Chris-
topher Knight’s personal blog, the George Lucas Education Foundation Maga-
zine Edutopia dubbed the commercial as the “[b]est campaign ad ever!”. THE 
KNIGHT SHIFT, http://theknightshift.blogspot.com/ (last visited Sep. 21, 2010). 
 90. See Christopher Knight, Christopher Knight for School Board TV 
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Junk 2.0, which operates similarly to America’s Funniest Home 
Videos, but featuring online videos,91 spotted it. Web Junk 2.0, 
finding Mr. Knight’s campaign ad good fodder for the show, 
made a segment lampooning Mr. Knight’s advertisement. The 
short segment re-used Mr. Knight’s original footage along with 
some additional commentary and the appearance of the show’s 
host.92 Mr. Knight saw the piece and enjoyed it so much that he 
reposted it on YouTube.93 However, Web Junk 2.0 did not ap-
preciate Mr. Knight’s unauthorized use and ordered YouTube 
to remove it under the DMCA’s notice and takedown proce-
dures. VH1 claimed that the extra commentary and the image 
of the show’s host in the video transformed it into a derivative 
work exclusively owned by VH1.94 Mr. Knight counter-notified 
and YouTube reposted the clip.95  After considerable publicity, 
Viacom ultimately backed down.96 While relatively undocu-
mented, Web Junk 2.0 is probably not unique in their use of 
YouTube and other UGC as a source of fresh concepts.97 
                                                          
Commercial #1, YOUTUBE (Oct. 6, 2006), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nLi5B0Iefsk. 
 91. Chris Marlowe, VH1, iFilm unspooling “Web Junk,’ HOLLYWOOD 
REPORTER, Dec. 28, 2005, available at 
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/hr/search/article_display.jsp?vnu_content_i
d=1001738403 (reporting on the new series, Web Junk 2.0, which uses viral 
Internet videos for its show). The aim is a democratic “viewer-generated” 
show. Id. Interestingly, no suggestion appears that permission will be sought 
to replay the videos. Id. 
 92. See Web Junk 2.0: Episode 306: Animals and Other Crap (VH1 Televi-
sion Broadcast July 6, 2008). 
 93. Web Junk 2.0 on VH1 Features My School Board Commercial, 
YOUTUBE (July 11, 2007), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ddyVQwpByug. 
 94. See Christopher Knight, Viacom Situation Update: YouTube Has Res-
tored My Clip, THE KNIGHT SHIFT, (Nov. 21, 2009, 11:50 PM), 
http://theknightshift.blogspot.com/2007/09/viacom-situation-update-youtube-
has.html. 
 95. See Viacom v. Knight, CITIZEN MEDIA LAW PROJECT, (Aug. 29, 2008), 
http://www.citmedialaw.org/threats/viacom-v-knight (summarizing the events 
that took place between Knight and Viacom). 
 96. Compare Tim P., Comment to YouTube-Related Legal Disputes, Part I, 
WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Sept. 1, 2007, 12:44 PM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2007/08/31/youtube-related-lawsuits-part-i/ (noting 
that Viacom came off as “tin-eared” and suffered “a lot of negative publicity” 
for its actions toward Chris Knight), and Vindu Goel, Followup: Chris Knight 
Wins Battle with Viacom over YouTube Clip, VINDU’S VIEW FROM THE VALLEY, 
http://blogs.mercurynews.com/vindu/2007/09/11/followup-chris-knight-wins-
battle-with-viacom-over-youtube-clip/ (commenting that Viacom elected not to 
file suit). 
 97. Since 2006, there have been a number of business initiatives to profit 
on UGC by using everyday peoples’ creative work posted online. See Halbert, 
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C. PROTECTING UGC: SOME SENSIBLE SUGGESTIONS 
In its current form, copyright law protects all forms of 
creativity, but favors major content providers.98 Until recently 
this disconnect did not raise many issues. However with the 
rise of the Internet and, in particular, the explosion of UGC, 
the system has come under assault. UGC providers have more 
or less used copyrighted materials with impunity. Copyright 
holders have responded to the onslaught with a broad brush, 
challenging almost all unauthorized uses of their copyright 
when discovered. To remedy the inadequacies of the system, 
Congress should amend the DMCA with three broad themes in 
mind: sharply reducing (or preferably eliminating) liability for 
non-economic UGC, increasing the copyright policing responsi-
bility of sites specializing in UGC content, and reducing frivol-
ous and/or non-particularized claims of infringement. To that 
effect, this Note suggests that the legal framework should (1) 
carve out an exception for key historical and cultural interac-
tions, (2) turn fair use into a presumption, rather than an af-
firmative defense, (3) put some teeth into the requirement that 
copyright holders must show a good faith basis for issuing a ta-
kedown request, (4) provide useful guidelines for legal UGC, (5) 
develop a mutually beneficial creative licensing system, (6) cap 
damages for garden variety UGC, and (7) increase the respon-
sibility of UGC-centric websites to police their content for copy-
right infringement. 
1. Carving Out an Exception for Important Cultural Moments 
and Interactions 
The DMCA should provide immunity to users who copy an 
entire work that is an important cultural moment or interac-
                                                          
supra note 6, at 949, n.131 (citing Peter Grant, Invasion of the Hamster Video; 
Comcast and Verizon Test Market for Putting Homemade Videos on TV, GLOBE 
& MAIL (Canada), Nov. 8, 2006, at B13). The content generated by users is 
considered raw material rife with potential for creating new products. Id. 
Grant does not discuss the ways in which users might be personally compen-
sated for the commercial appropriation of their videos. Id. 
 98. See id. at 923–24 (commenting that a few companies have come to 
dominate commercial culture and that those juggernauts wield copyright as a 
sword against the “little guy” while freely borrowing from non-commercial 
sources). As such, copyright actively protects the commercial culture industry, 
which has the resources to enforce its rights, but also lets commercial culture 
poach from non-commercial culture since non-commercial culture suffers from 
a lack of resources, expertise, and the will to fight back consistently. 
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tion99 and reproduce it with no attempt to profit or reduce the 
value of the work.100 Copyrighted works on YouTube often 
prove resilient to even zealous removal efforts.101 Frequently, 
multiple users have already posted largely similar clips many 
of which are not discovered and ordered removed.102 In other 
cases, the removed clip might be reposted either by the original 
or new posters.103 Moreover, individuals post with the know-
ledge (or at least they ought to know) that they risk litigation. 
And, meaningfully, they (usually) entertain that small risk of 
litigation even though they have little to no hope of profiting 
from their efforts. 
If financial gain is seemingly not the goal, what explains 
the pervasiveness of copyright material on sites like YouTube 
and users’ resistance to permanently removing infringing ma-
terial? YouTube and its brethren open up a vast vista of oppor-
                                                          
 99. What constitutes important cultural moments or interactions has 
many permutations. At minimum, key national events like electoral debates, 
the State of the Union, Inaugural Addresses or the moon landing would fall 
under the penumbra of “important cultural moments or interactions.” Also, 
chart topping music hits, bestselling books, and leading televisions shows like 
Oprah, Seinfeld, and The Office in addition to blockbuster movies such as Star 
Wars, Forrest Gump, and Gone with the Wind would, after a fair period of 
time to recoup financial outlays, earn a profit, and then settle into the national 
conscious (for example, five years after publication) would constitute impor-
tant cultural moments or interactions. Even after that period, UGC producers 
would not be allowed to reproduce entire commercial works, but, rather parts 
of a work to make mash-ups, parodies, and other creative works without fear 
of a copyright infringement lawsuit. 
 100. Cf. Halbert, supra note 6, at 936–37(showing that beyond the obvious 
copyright infringers that purposefully rip off copyrights in an effort to profit, 
groups that infringe copyrights as a matter of principle (e.g., “copyfighters” 
that oppose the copyright system) and infringers that provide free access to a 
song in its entirety that consumers would otherwise have to buy would gener-
ally not be eligible for this exemption). 
 101. See Branwen Buckley, Note, SueTube: Web 2.0 and Copyright In-
fringement, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 235, 238–39 (2008) (commenting that de-
spite NBC Universal’s best efforts, removed postings on YouTube would inva-
riably pop up again for popular works). 
 102. See Kevin C. Hormann, Comment, The Death of DMCA? How Viacom 
v. YouTube May Define the Future of Digital Content, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 1345, 
1355–56 (2009) (highlighting that the amount of bandwidth usage on You-
Tube—on par with the whole Internet circa 2000—combined with simple 
means of hiding infringing material through, for example, seemingly inno-
cuous file appellations makes it unfeasible to find all infringing material). 
 103. See Jane C. Ginsburg, Separating the Sony Sheep from the Grokster 
Goats: Reckoning the Future Business Plans of Copyright-Dependent Technolo-
gy Entrepreneurs, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 577, 591 (2008) (describing the takedown-
re-post cycle as “hydra-like” since for each video removed, two more spring up 
to replace it). 
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tunities for users to share and adapt one of the United States’ 
most common forms of cultural expression: the commercial cul-
ture.104 The result adds value by “decommodify[ing] these cul-
tural moments and giv[ing] them authentic meaning . . . that 
cannot exist without the shared value contributed by the people 
who are linked through a common cultural experience.”105 For 
instance, in the 2006 White House Correspondents’ Association 
dinner, Stephen Colbert roasted President Bush. Among the 
mainstream media, the speech was considered an unmitigated 
flop,106 but it quickly became a fixture on YouTube, surviving 
repeated efforts to remove it as a copyright violation.107 One 
viewer comment from a YouTube version of the speech nicely 
summarizes a key aspect of how UGC has altered communica-
tion: 
This whole thing is interesting, because he’s not playing to the crowd 
who was in that dinner hall that night. He was playing to the people 
at home and those (like us) who would watch it on the Internet later. 
WE were the ones who found it hilarious. Not just because of what he 
said, but because the crowd there TOTALLY DIDN’T.108 
In a world where cultural references are primarily visual 
(rather than text-based), having a venue like YouTube that 
provides a medium for distributing and commenting on visual 
content plays much the same role as newspapers, books, and 
the agoras of old. Here allowing the established, old format me-
dia to bar the clip from YouTube would do a disservice to politi-
cal discourse. Instead of relying on the punditry’s thoughts 
about an event, a viewer can sit down, see the clip in its entire-
ty, discuss it with the rest of the “unwashed masses,”109 and 
                                                          
 104. See Halbert, supra note 6, at. at 936. 
 105. Halbert, supra note 6, at. at 937. 
 106. See Michael Scherer, The Truthiness Hurts, SALON (May 1, 2006, 3:28 
PM), http://www.salon.com/opinion/feature/2006/05/01/colbert/ (providing one 
account of the press reaction regarding many who were uncomfortable with 
Colbert’s approach; it was not what they expected). 
 107. One version (among many) of the speech posted has over 2,000,000 
views and more than 6000 comments. Colbert Roasts Bush, YOUTUBE (Aug. 
26, 2007), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BSE_saVX_2A. 
 108. JamesOhGoodie, Comment to Colbert Roasts Bush, YOUTUBE (Nov. 
2008), 
http://www.youtube.com/comment_servlet?all_comments=1&v=BSE_saVX_2A
&page=10 (last visited Feb. 6, 2010). 
 109. The author uses the colloquialism “unwashed masses” in contrast to 
the political “elite” (i.e., the traditional fare of professional pundits, political 
strategists, and columnists) generally brought in to comment on the news of 
the day by traditional news sources. 
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form an opinion based on that collective dialogue. In an era of 
news media consolidation,110 UGC offers an avenue for main-
taining healthy, vigorous debate. 
2. Turn Fair Use into a Presumption 
Currently fair use can only be raised as an affirmative de-
fense once litigation has begun.  However, works on platforms 
like YouTube that include more than de minimis creative addi-
tions should be presumptively considered fair use.111 Take, for 
example, Stephanie Lenz. Stephanie Lenz posted a twenty-
nine-second video on YouTube of her baby dancing to Prince’s 
“Let’s Go Crazy.”112 Though seemingly innocuous, a request to 
take down the material was issued and only after Lenz chal-
lenged the removal request via YouTube’s counter-notification 
process did the video stay.113 Although the counter-notification 
process worked in Lenz’s case, many (if not most) YouTube 
posters would not similarly challenge a removal request (due to 
the time, financial commitment, or, perhaps, out of a sense of 
discomfort with their legal position).114 The current form of the 
DMCA encourages these kinds of egregious removal requests115 
since the copyright holder has an investment in policing his or 
her copyright property while the content user has much less 
                                                          
 110. See Paul Wellstone, Growing Media Consolidation Must Be Examined 
to Preserve Our Democracy, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 551, 551 (1999–2000). 
 111. See Halbert, supra note 6, at 941. 
 112. See “Let’s Go Crazy” #1, YOUTUBE, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N1KfJHFWlhQ (Feb. 7, 2007). 
 113. See Lawrence Lessig, In Defense of Piracy, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 2008, 
at W3. Lenz countered and argued her video was a fair use. See Lenz v. Uni-
versal Music Corp., No. 07 Civ. 3783 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2008), 2010 WL 
1610074 (granting Lenz’s motion to dismiss); Timothy B. Lee, Fair Use Gets a 
Fair Shake: YouTube Tot to Get Day in Court, ARS TECHNICA (Aug. 21, 2008, 
10:30 AM), http://arstechnica.com/old/content/2008/08/fair-use-gets-a-fair-
shake-youtube-tot-to-get-day-in-court.ars. 
 114. See BATUR OKTAY & GREG WRENN, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. 
ORG., WORKSHOP ON SERVICE PROVIDER LIABILITY: A LOOK BACK AT THE 
NOTICE-TAKEDOWN PROVISIONS OF THE U.S. DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT 
ACT ONE YEAR AFTER ENACTMENT 17 (1999), available at 
www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/osp_lia/osp_lia_2.doc (noting that in Ya-
hoo!’s experience very few users utilize the counter-notification process). 
 115. Another form of egregiousness has also been suggested—perjury. Co-
bia, supra note 74, at 399 (arguing that the DMCA’s truth-telling requirement 
has little value in dissuading copyright holders from committing perjury since 
most takedown requests are not challenged and that when contested the per-
jurer can simply decline to file a lawsuit and thereby avoid the statements 
from ever coming before a judge). 
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stake in the fight. As such, a very interested minority (copy-
right holders) can abuse a much less invested majority (content 
up-loaders). But this all too common pattern does not accord 
with the purposes underlying copyright law, stands in stark 
contrast to other creative activities, may actually conflict with 
the First Amendment, and wrongly relies on the supposition 
that UGC producers necessarily harm the value of the copy-
right holder’s copyright. 
First, copyright law aims to “promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts . . . .”116 Put differently, the Framers 
aimed to benefit society by promoting a robust marketplace of 
ideas that flourishes best when public access to new works is 
readily available since the ideas underlying the works keep 
progress churning by facilitating discourse and spawning new 
works.117 For example, scientists use past experiments as a 
starting point in designing new experiments while artists use 
past artwork (albeit unconsciously much of the time) as the ba-
sis of future works.118 Unfortunately, the current framework 
works at cross-purposes opposing works that parlay a small 
piece of copyrighted work into a new, original work. 
Second, a presumption of fair use for UGC that only bor-
rows modest amounts of other’s work would bring UGC juri-
sprudence in line with academic writing in which citations to 
other academic works are presumptively legal. For instance, 
this Note cites to over a hundred other sources. Likewise, a fair 
use presumption would also bring UGC in line with pre-
computer era re-creations of commercial culture. For example, 
at some point even the most closeted of people experience ex-
changes that draw heavily on cultural products from liberal 
quoting of Monty Python,119 Seinfeld,120 and Saturday Night 
                                                          
 116. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 117. Of course, not all re-uses produce something socially desirable, but 
neither does all traditional speech and yet the Founders went out of their way 
to protect speech via the First Amendment. 
 118. See DAVID HUME, ENQUIRIES CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 
AND CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 19 (P. H. Nidditch ed., Oxford 
University Press Third ed. 2000) (1777) (writing that “though our thought 
seems to possess . . . unbounded liberty . . . [the] creative power of the mind 
amounts to no more than the faculty of compounding, transposing, augment-
ing, or diminishing the materials afforded us by the senses and experience”). 
 119. For example, the Black Knight saying, “It’s just a flesh wound” after 
King Arthur chops off both of his arms. MONTY PYTHON AND THE HOLY GRAIL 
(Python (Monty) Pictures 1975). 
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Live to the re-enactment of other famous scenes or images. Be-
fore the days of uploading onto the Internet, these interactions 
would seldom, if ever, have been prosecuted. Likewise, they 
should not be now.121 
Third, the current DMCA takedown procedure as used may 
actually constitute a prior restraint122 and therefore violate the 
First Amendment.123 That is, copyright holders often issue ta-
kedowns for non-infringing works (i.e., speech) which websites 
as a matter of course will take down until and unless the UGC 
up-loader successfully challenges the request. In other contexts, 
such as newspapers and books, courts would strike down such a 
scheme as a violation of the First Amendment.124 Similarly, 
here, because of the almost non-existent burden required of 
copyright holders before they demand allegedly infringing con-
tent taken down, copyright holders can effectively restrain 
First Amendment rights without judicial oversight. And while 
copyright law is generally carved out of First Amendment juri-
sprudence, the sheer volume of inappropriate takedown re-
                                                          
 120. Elaine telling Jerry and George “Yeah, I met this lawyer, we went out 
to dinner, I had the lobster bisque, we went back to my place, yada yada yada, 
I never heard from him again.” George replies, “But you yada yada’d over the 
best part” to which Elaine retorts, “No, I mentioned the bisque.” Seinfeld 
(NBC television broadcast Apr. 24, 1997). 
 121. While re-hashing Monty Python may seem silly or insignificant at first 
blush, UGC serves an important role as society increasingly transitions from 
text-centric to video-based communication. When cultural consumers re-create 
or adapt a cultural work without a financial motive “they are decommodifying 
culture by taking it out of its profit-oriented platform and transforming it not 
only into a derivative work under copyright law, but also into something that 
has cultural meaning that goes beyond monetary value.” Halbert, supra note 
6, at 940 (footnote omitted). Websites like YouTube have caught on to a power-
ful phenomenon that provides people from various communities and, even, 
continents the ability to interact with others through a common language 
based on shared cultural experiences. 
 122. A prior restraint is when speech is halted or stopped, usually through 
legal means, before a court can properly assess whether it is constitutional or 
not. For example, if a city mayor issued a rule barring the local newspaper 
from printing an unfavorable article, that would be a prior restraint. See Mark 
A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellec-
tual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 169–72 (1997). 
 123. A lengthy discussion of the First Amendment, prior restraint, and the 
DMCA is beyond the scope of this paper, but for a fuller discussion, see id. 
Parts II, IV (discussing the First Amendment implications of copyright law 
generally and arguing that copyright infringement injunctions at least some-
times violate the First Amendment). Note that thus far the Supreme Court 
has consistently ruled that the First Amendment does not protect copyright-
infringing speech against injunctions and other prior restraints. Id. Part II.A. 
 124. Id. at 149. 
121_SUNDELL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/4/2011  7:50 AM 
356 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 12:1 
 
 
quests suggests that the DMCA does a disservice to free speech 
by letting copyright holders trample on the First Amendment 
in the name of copyright. 
Moreover, even if one ignores the underlying purpose of 
copyright law and the First Amendment issues in favor of fo-
cusing solely on the self-interest of copyright holders, it is falla-
cious to assume that remuneration of copyright holders and li-
mited unauthorized use by garden-variety UGC up-loaders 
cannot coexist happily. Indeed, re-use may actually increase 
the popularity of the work, which likely aids the content own-
er.125 For example, more than a million views of Ms. Lenz’s vid-
eo raised the profile of Prince’s song, “Let’s Go Crazy.”126 Or, 
take for instance, a YouTube video of a Minnesota wedding in 
which the entire wedding party danced down the aisle to Chris 
Brown’s song, “Forever.” After the video went viral, sales of the 
song soared on iTunes.127 And, even if the particular UGC work 
does not generate riches for the copyright holder, by the point a 
work has to worry about mass infringement (through minor in-
fringements like soundtracks to collages or trip videos) the 
work usually has garnered sufficient popularity that the copy-
right holder has already been well rewarded. 
Unfortunately, the current copyright regime overzealously 
combats potential infringement by making UGC producers 
guilty until proven innocent128 while failing to sufficiently con-
sider the non-monetary value of later adaptations129 as an out-
                                                          
 125. This is particularly true where the content user provides a link to the 
iTunes store (or another commercial outlet) for those interested in buying the 
song, movie, or other work. Also, note that under current fair use jurispru-
dence, expansion of a copyright holder’s market generally would militate in 
favor of finding a fair use. Kelly v. Arriba Soft, 336 F.3d 811, 821 (9th Cir. 
2003). 
 126. See “Let’s Go Crazy” #1, YOUTUBE (Feb. 7, 2007), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N1KfJHFWlhQ (listing a view count of 
1,050,576 on August 28, 2010). 
 127. Brad Stone, YouTube Wedding Video Spurs Music Sales, N.Y. TIMES 
BITS BLOG, (July 30, 2009, 1:26 PM), 
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/07/30/youtube-trumpets-popularity-of-viral-
wedding-dance/. 
 128. USER GENERATED CONTENT PRINCIPLES, 
http://www.ugcprinciples.com/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2009); Internet and Media 
Industry Leaders Unveil Principles to Foster Online Innovation While Protect-
ing Copyrights, VEOH.COM (Oct. 18, 2007), 
http://www.veoh.com/corporate/pressroom/article/10_18_2007 (claiming in es-
sence that any “user” activity inevitably infringes). 
 129. Over-inclusive takedown requests also ignore potential positive finan-
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let of self-expression or for the potential transformative aspect 
of art that can result from the adaptations.130 Re-fashioning 
fair use from a shield into a sword would do much to mitigate 
the more significant abuses rampant under the current legal 
framework. 
3. Putting Some Teeth into the Good Faith Requirement 
Abusers of the DMCA’s takedown procedure should face 
repercussions.131 Overly aggressive notice and takedown proce-
dures that harm free speech rights as well as frivolous and 
overzealous protection of copyrighted material need to have 
consequences that make copyright owners pause, even for a 
moment, to consider whether or not to bring a claim. Perhaps if 
Mr. Knight could have successfully countersued VH1 for exces-
sive notice and takedown procedures, VH1 and its parent or-
ganization, Viacom, given their unclean hands, would not have 
filed a takedown notice. After all, VH1, not Mr. Knight, set the 
matter in motion by coming across Mr. Knight’s original cam-
paign spot on YouTube and then electing to use it on a for-
profit program without compensating Mr. Knight or even try-
ing to get his authorization. 
Of course, the DMCA technically has a provision prevent-
ing abusive takedown procedures.132 However, in practice, this 
provision has little teeth since courts have been reluctant to 
apply it in all but the most flagrant cases of misuse.133 Rather 
than applying the DMCA test as currently interpreted, the 
DMCA language or case law should become more evenhanded. 
This could come in several different forms. For example, courts 
could raise a copyright holder’s burden before asking a site to 
take down material. Another (similar) option is to require a 
                                                          
cial repercussions of UGC. Infra Part II.C.ii. 
 130. See, e.g., Red vs. Blue / Why Are We Here?, YOUTUBE, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9BAM9fgV-ts (June 2, 2008). Red vs. Blue is 
a comic science fiction video series based on Halo, a popular Xbox video game. 
Originally produced without permission, Bungie, the developer of Halo gave 
the series its blessing. Within a year of that magnanimity Red vs. Blue had 
acquired a viewership of between 650,000 and 1,000,000. See Kevin J. Dela-
ney, When Art Imitates Videogames, You Have “Red vs. Blue,” WALL ST. J., 
Apr. 9, 2004, at A1 (exemplifying the Machinima artistic movement); Interview 
of Red vs. Blue, MACHINIMA.COM (Dec. 22 2003), 
http://machinima.com/article/view&id=390. 
 131. Halbert, supra note 6, at 957. 
 132. 17 U.S.C. § 512(f). 
 133. See Online Policy Grp. v. Diebold, 337 F. Supp. 2d 1204, 1204–05 
(N.D. Cal. 2004); see also Chung, supra note 53, at 171. 
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copyright holder to satisfy an objective good faith standard be-
fore requesting a takedown notice. For instance, courts could 
use a three-part analytical framework akin to the fair use test. 
Under this framework, before requesting a takedown a copy-
right holder must ask: (1) whether the user profited from the 
UGC, (2) whether the UGC harmed or diminished the value of 
the copyrighted work or threatened to do so, and (3) whether 
the UGC producer uploaded most, if not all, of the copyrighted 
work without adding value to it such as with new content or 
other creative elements.134 If the answer to all three questions 
is “no,” the DMCA should prohibit the copyright holder from 
sending a takedown notice.135 
4. Creating Order Out of Chaos: Less Quibbling, More 
Guidance 
Copyright infringement in UGC cases inevitably turns on a 
case-by-case factual analysis.136 While a highly fact-specific 
analysis has its advantages—namely justice in the individual 
case—it also has some significant drawbacks such as unpredic-
tability. Unpredictability in the UGC-context stacks the deck in 
favor of copyright holders since it makes litigation more expen-
sive and enables copyright holders to make what are in reality 
bad faith takedown requests while credibly claiming good faith 
given the current low bar under the DMCA. Instead of a highly 
fact-intensive analysis, the DMCA should provide more explicit 
guidance on what is and is not acceptable. For instance, trans-
formative and other productive uses of copyright works137 
should be exempt from statutory actual damages.138 While a 
court can later do justice, it makes sense simply to re-work the 
                                                          
 134. Chung, supra note 53, at 182−87. 
 135. Id. at 182. 
 136. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (cit-
ing Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990)) (stating that the fair use doc-
trine “permits [and requires] courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright 
statute.”). 
 137. This Note does not propose to flesh out the exact line for what uses 
deserve exemption, but hopefully has provided some initial guidelines to start 
the decision-making process. 
 138. John Tehranian, Whither Copyright? Transformative Use, Free Speech, 
and an Intermediate Liability Proposal, 2005 BYU L. REV. 1201, 1207. See also 
Zahr Said Stauffer, Po-Mo Karaoke or Postcolonial Pastiche? What Fair Use 
Analysis Could Draw from Literary Criticism, 31 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 42, 44 
(2007) (arguing that courts should adopt categories of per se acceptable deriva-
tives to make downstream creative derivative works less perilous). 
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law to avoid the necessity of judicial proceedings in the first 
place for most cases by installing guidelines that allow actors to 
predict outcomes ahead of time. 
5. A Win-Win: Implementing a Creative License System 
Congress should consider implementing a mandatory crea-
tive licensing system. Copyright law’s attempts to impose lia-
bility on a defendant for the acts of a third party have not 
worked well in the Internet context.139 Rather than fighting ra-
pidly advancing distribution technology, copyright holders 
could try to turn a profit from it instead. For example, some 
websites have pursued pre-emptive licensing that shares reve-
nue with content owners so that users could post copyrighted 
material under the terms of that license.140 Under a licensing 
scheme, if a UGC photo or video were posted on a site, the own-
er of the site would direct some of the ad revenue generated 
from traffic to the UGC to the relevant copyright holder.141 
6. Capping Damages 
The current DMCA damages computation needs revisiting 
                                                          
 139. See Lateef Mtima, Copyright Social Utility and Social Justice Interde-
pendence: A Paradigm for Intellectual Property Empowerment and Digital En-
trepreneurship, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 97, 117 (2009) (stating that “surreptitious 
digital duplication and distribution of copyrighted material and the inability of 
Internet Service Providers . . . to monitor the activities of their customers” has 
proved too much for traditional copyright to successfully police). 
 140. YouTube, for instance, entered into a revenue sharing agreement with 
the NBA to let users post clips. Keith Regan, YouTube Scores Licensing Deal 
with NBA, E-COMMERCE TIMES (Feb. 27, 2007, 2:12 PM), 
http://www.ecommercetimes.com/story/55996.html; Dianna Dilwoth, YouTube 
Slammed With $1B Viacom Suit after Netting NBA, BBC Deals, DIGITAL 
MARKETING NEWS (Mar. 22, 2007), http://www.dmnews.com/youtube-
slammed-with-1b-viacom-suit-after-netting-nba-bbc-deals/article/94943/. You-
Tube has also reached agreements with CBS Corporation, Vivendi Universal, 
Warner Music Group, and Sony BMG Music Entertainment among others to 
proactively deal with posting copyrighted material. See Meghan Keane, You-
Tube Goes Legit, Begins Streaming Approved CBS Content, WIRED, (Oct. 10, 
2008, 12:38 PM), http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2008/10/youtube-goes-le/; 
Adam Satariano & Brian Womack, Bono Plays Matchmaker as YouTube, Uni-
versal Create Music Site, BLOOMBERG, (Apr. 14, 2009, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aaEHAG7vyT94; 
Erika Morphy, Warner, YouTube Dance to New Music Deal, E-COMMERCE 
TIMES (Sept. 29, 2009 12:23 PM), 
http://www.ecommercetimes.com/story/68244.html. 
 141. In addition to paying copyright holders for revenue derived from the 
page with their content, the copyright holder should also get a piece of the rev-
enue for page views resulting from their work drawing the user to the website. 
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in the context of UGC. As mentioned earlier, U.S. copyright law 
provides for statutory damages of between $750 and $30,000 
per work infringed.142 For even an unpopular non-commercial 
video clip posted on YouTube, the minimum damage adds up 
quickly. If a travel collage of a recent trip uses five copyrighted 
songs, the poster would face at least $3,750 and as much as 
$150,000 in damages. Instead, the DMCA should differentiate 
between commercial and non-commercial uses. Where an ama-
teur content producer uses copyrighted material for a non-
commercial use, fines should be nominal or, at least, signifi-
cantly curtailed. Much room exists for how to accomplish the 
reduction,143 but the failure to distinguish between commercial 
and non-commercial uses of a copyrighted work gives copyright 
holders a significant sword to threaten the average UGC pro-
ducer in situations involving minor appropriations of copy-
righted work. 
7. Police Thyself: Holding UGC Sites Responsible for Their 
Content 
While copyright law and the DMCA treat individual users 
too harshly, they fail to treat OSPs strongly enough. The 
DMCA exemplifies the phrase “ignorance is bliss” since OSPs 
need not act unless they know of a violation.144 If the OSP does 
not investigate, it will not discover any violations and, there-
fore, will not have to take action. Additionally, a plaintiff’s bur-
den of proof for showing an OSP’s knowledge is significant.145 
                                                          
 142. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2007). 
 143. To name a couple options, damage could be allotted based on the ex-
tent of the infringement (such as whether the infringing work used a little or a 
lot of the copyrighted material) or based on the number of views. 
 144. See Ballon, supra note 71, at 687 (stating that copyright holders have 
the primary investigative responsibility); H.R. REP. NO. 105-551(11), at 53 
(1998) (asserting that “a service provider need not monitor its service or affir-
matively seek facts indicating infringing activity . . . .”). 
 145. For example, in Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 
1090, 1105–08 (W.D. Wash. 2004), the court noted that “[a]ctual knowledge of 
blatant, repeat infringement cannot be imputed merely from the receipt of no-
tices of infringement. . . . Instead, the question is whether the service provider 
deliberately proceeded in the face of blatant factors of which it was aware . . . 
[or] turned a blind eye to ‘red flags’ of obvious infringement.” Consider also 
Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill, LLC, 488 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2007) which found that 
a “red flag” must be “fire engine red” before an OSP needs to take down ma-
terial on its own initiative (assuming that the OSP did not have actual know-
ledge or a substantially complying notification). 
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In concert, a copyright holder’s high burden of proof and OSPs’ 
studious ignorance effectively insulates OSPs from liability. 
However, when a website derives a significant portion of 
its revenue from UGC content, a higher standard of care should 
be triggered.146 That is, when a site does not rely on copyright 
suspect UGC, the current DMCA standard should remain. 
Conversely, if a site explicitly or implicitly attempts to draw 
UGC that has a heightened tendency to violate copyright law 
and which amounts to a significant part of the site’s business in 
absolute or relative terms, that site should have a higher duty 
to investigate the material on its site.147 For instance, YouTube 
would probably fall in the latter category148 since it maintains 
quite a bit of infringing material and historically has profited 
from the ad revenue that copyright suspect content draws to 
the website. Sites like Blogger.com, which do not rely on sus-
pect classes of copyrighted material149 as part of its business 
model, on the other hand, would retain the DMCA’s current 
standard. 
Amending the knowledge requirement for UGC sites would 
have a second benefit as well. Copyright holders, especially 
small copyright holders, have considerable difficulty policing 
individual violations against their works.150 Amending the 
DMCA’s knowledge requirement in order to transfer some of 
the enforcement burden to sites that significantly profit from 
UGC material would, at a minimum, make it easier for copy-
                                                          
 146. The DMCA’s lack of an investigatory requirement also does injustice 
to small copyright holders. See Cobia, supra note 74, at 397. As vast as the In-
ternet is, individuals and small companies simply do not have the resources to 
patrol the Web for copyright infractions. Perhaps the lesson for purposeful 
copyright infringers is to look for copyrights not attached to major corpora-
tions. That way they can infringe with near impunity given the unlikelihood 
small copyright holders would uncover the infringer’s work. 
 147. The investigatory requirement should not be too onerous. A small staff 
of researchers or some other means of a good faith basis for reviewing material 
should be sufficient to trigger the DMCA safe harbor. If the requirement be-
came too steep, websites would remove anything conceivably infringing to 
avoid liability. 
 148. However, YouTube’s use of copyright filtering software might push it 
into the first, less infringing category, where the current DMCA standard re-
mains. 
 149. Suspect classes of UGC means UGC with a significant propensity to 
contain copyright infringing material. 
 150. Given the sheer volume of UGC, “[c]hasing individual consumers is [a] 
time consuming . . . teaspoon solution to an ocean problem .” Randal C. Picker, 
Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital Distribution, 47 ANTITRUST 
BULL. 423, 442 (2002). 
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right holders to protect their property and, at best, might ac-
tually make a small copyright holder’s copyrights more lucra-
tive.151 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Though the rise of UGC has taxed the copyright legal 
structure, it is worth remembering that UGC’s recent emer-
gence is but the latest in a string of challenges to copyright law. 
And just like previous squalls, copyright law will weather this 
storm too. Rather than giving in to the current panic in which 
many copyright holders have used the DMCA and copyright 
law as a sword against any and all UGC, Congress and the 
courts should instead keep a level head and institute a number 
of small, simple alterations that would make copyrights more 
profitable while giving the average UGC creator greater oppor-
tunities to express their creativity. 
First, non-financial UGC should be presumptively permiss-
ible. Such a presumption would cover the (mostly) harmless 
and inadvertent use of copyrights by people putting together 
the odd vacation video collage or party video. 
Second, UGC copyright litigation needs less fact-sensitive 
analysis and more broad guidelines. This would enable copy-
right users to have a better sense of what uses fall on the per-
missible or impermissible side of the line. Also, because clear 
guidelines give litigants a better sense of their legal position, it 
would lighten the docket load of courts under siege with You-
Tube and other UGC copyright infringement cases by discou-
raging some lawsuits, settling others, and only encouraging a 
few to go all the way through the litigation process. 
Third, the DMCA’s provision permitting UGC providers to 
sue copyright holders for bad faith use of the takedown proce-
dure needs more teeth. Like broad guidelines, strengthening 
bad faith mechanisms would lessen docket loads and reduce lit-
igation costs by incentivizing copyright holders like Vivendi to 
pause for a moment before issuing an avalanche of takedown 
requests, many of which might be groundless. 
                                                          
 151. Currently, small copyright holders do not have the time, resources, or 
incentive to actively police their copyrights. A UGC site that polices itself 
when it makes use of the small copyright holder’s copyright would direct some 
of their ad revenue earned from using the copyrighted material to the copy-
right holder. This would create revenue for the copyright that it would not 
generate under the current system. 
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Fourth, a creative licensing system should be installed to 
more justly spread UGC revenue. Websites like YouTube that 
profit from works using unauthorized copyrights should not 
profit disproportionately. Instead, a creative licensing system 
would be a win-win. Websites like YouTube would garner reve-
nue, but so too would copyright holders earn revenue that they 
might not have otherwise. 
Fifth, damages for UGC with a non-commercial purpose 
and/or effect should be significantly curtailed. The key here is 
non-commercial. The run-of-the-mill up-loader making videos 
because he enjoys producing videos should not be on the hook 
for up to $210,000 for a two-minute video that uses snippets 
from seven songs. 
Finally, the DMCA should be amended to require more 
self-policing by OSPs specializing in copyright suspect UGC. In 
the current environment, the law’s expectation—that copyright 
holders police their own work—can be a full-time job and a 
half. Extending that responsibility to website purveyors of UGC 
that fully expect to profit from the use of those copyrights 
seems only fair. Applying the above recommendations with a 
clear focus on diminishing liability for non-economic UGC, im-
posing increased responsibilities on sites specializing in UGC 
content, and reducing frivolous lawsuits would go a long way 
toward mitigating the worst of the conflicts between UGC and 
copyrights while paving the way to an amicable online future. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
